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This paper aims at discussing the opportunities and the threats that 
democratic regimes face today in southern countries. More than 
twenty years ago, Bobbio warned of the risks incurred by a 
democracy in the absence of an active, critical, and well-organized 
citizenry that continually puts pressure on its country’s rulers and 
the leaders of its political parties, since “when politics are 
sequestered by just a few citizens, the richest and the powerful, in 
order to satisfy their interests and perpetuate their mandate, the 
citizenry loses interest in politics” (Bobbio 1986:25). In such cases, 
even when they exist in a formal sense, democratic institutions are 
bereft of all content. 
The political culture of the twenty-first century has been 
characterized by the apathy of citizens and the discrediting of both 
political parties and their leaders, as well as a lack of interest in 
public matters. This is especially true of the younger generation. 
Furthermore, the hazards impinging upon the consolidation of 
democracy are more severe in countries where social differences 
and poverty have increased considerably because the governments 
are in a less favorable position to make decisions regarding their 
resources. 
Twenty years ago, of the 18 countries included in the UNDP report 
(2004) entitled Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ 
Democracy, only Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela were 
considered to be “democracies.” In contrast, at present we can 
observe a panorama of relative peace from the Rio Grande to 
Patagonia and authoritarian governments have given way to more or 
less democratic systems (which at least can be considered as 
electoral democracies). 
Yet after nearly two decades of democratizing experiences, many 
citizens of Latin American and Caribbean countries are dissatisfied 
with their governments’ performance because, for the most part, 
they feel that these governments born of democratic processes have 
a poor track record in terms of well-being and economic prosperity. 
In this subcontinent, regardless of their democratic consolidation 
degree, all countries to some extent have had to endure the 
negative effects produced by economic policies dictated from 
abroad by international financial agencies. These economic 
measures, known as the Washington Consensus, have led to the 
deterioration of wages; growing unemployment; the abandonment 
of agriculture; a decrease in welfare policies in the areas of health, 
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education, and housing; and, in general they have produced, 
unequal income distribution. 
Aside from the problems affecting consolidation, the “new 
democracies” in Latin America have been confronting problems 
similar to those faced by “consolidated democracies,” which we 
could also term “worn-out democracies.” In Western European and 
North American countries, the loss of confidence in politics, parties 
and, above all, “political leaders” has been expressed through 
growing indifference and the withdrawal of citizens towards their 
“private” lives. Several authors have ascribed this disparagement of 
politics in the twenty-first century to the effects of globalization 
because it has produced cultural changes at two levels: a) in the 
intensity of communications, which leads to a destructuring of 
social and political identities; and b) due to the ability to mobilize 
resources and information instantly throughout the world, which 
leads to a real dissolution of the borders of national states. The 
breakdown of the State as a territory within which power is wielded 
is directly responsible for the discrediting of “politics” at the 
national level and of its institutional actors (political parties and 
rulers) because the population realizes that, in the final analysis, 
“they are not making the decisions.” 
In this context, I focus on the political party systems of several 
countries in their classic definition (institutions, political parties, 
electoral rules), because they provide the framework for power 
competition, but I intend to go further and aim at the evaluation of 
the "quality" of democracy. The comparison of the party system 
should consider the most recent changes that have taken place in 
recent years through electoral processes, where there has been a 
reorientation of political trends with the arrival of leftist 
candidates, as well as countries, like México where elections 
produced the change of political party in power but preserving a 
basic loyalty to neo-liberal politics. 
But, unlike some other preceding comparative projects, here I will 
be interested in considering some of the problems that democracy 
faces in the twenty first century, such as I will argue in the 
following pages. 
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GROWTH WITHOUT WELL-BEING 
In the 1990s, a reasonable degree of stability was also attained, and 
economic dynamism recovered. Nevertheless, there has been a 
major contradiction between these positive signs in politics and the 
economy, on the one hand, and the deterioration of the 
population’s living standards, on the other. As regards most of the 
population, the increase achieved in productivity in the past fifteen 
years and the relative economic stability attained have not led to 
well-being for its members. 
Although after the “lost decade” many countries have recovered a 
certain pace in their economic growth, a large majority of Latin 
Americans have not enjoyed the benefits they expected from 
governments arising from free, competitive electoral processes. The 
aforementioned UNDP report clearly reflected that attitude of 
disappointment and rejection among the citizenry: while 44.9% of 
Latin Americans would support an authoritarian government if it 
could solve their country’s economic woes, 41.9% would also accept 
paying the price of some amount of corruption to ensure a better 
situation. In addition, during the past two decades, poverty has not 
been cut back significantly, and continues to plague 225 million 
people, i.e., 43.9% of the population (UNDP 2004:39). 
In short, throughout the last twenty years economic growth has 
been achieved within the framework of inclusion in the world 
market, but income distribution has become worse, poverty has 
been increasing, and the sources of productive employment have 
been dismantled. On the whole, Latin American countries do not 
have the worst poverty levels in the world, but they do evidence 
the greatest inequality among the members of their societies. 
 
FACTORS THAT WEAKEN BOTH THE NEW AND OLD DEMOCRACIES 
Latin American democracies have evolved in countries often 
fragmented by a colonial legacy that left its mark with Indians and 
colonizers, slaves imported from other continents, immigrants, and 
Creole landowners. This legacy resulted in societies whose different 
cultures were poorly integrated into the national context or which 
exhibited profound structural contradictions still unresolved in the 
process of forming modern national states. I mention this cultural 
legacy because I feel that it would be very important to discuss this 
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issue in a seminar that includes the experiences of countries of the 
South on other continents. For the consolidation of a democratic 
regime, a common cultural ground for the interaction of political 
actors is very important. 
Drawing on the report Democracy in Latin America: Towards a 
Citizens’ Democracy published by the UNDP in 2004, we can cite 
eight factors that weaken emergent democracies in Latin America: 
1. There is a dearth of social citizenship. Thus, nearly all the 
countries in the region are plagued by greater inequality in income 
and wealth distribution than the world average. More than 25% of 
the citizens in 15 Latin American nations live under the poverty 
line; in seven, the proportion of the poor is over 50% of the 
population. There are 209 million people whose income is under the 
poverty line. Therefore, the status of well-being there is very 
fragile, as is reflected by the fact that seven out of every new jobs 
created in the region since 1990 are in the informal economy, 
whereas only six of every 10 new jobs created, covered by some 
kind of social protection. 
2. There is also a lack of civil citizenship. In other words, despite 
the progress made, the following rights have not been fully 
implemented: the right to individual liberty; freedom of expression, 
thought, and religion; the right to property and to enter into valid, 
legally secure contracts, etc. Citizens perceive that there are 
serious shortcomings in the way that justice is administered. 
According to a survey conducted by the UNDP, the majority feel 
that there is still a long way to go to attain reasonable conditions of 
equality before the law (the rich always or nearly always manage to 
assert their rights, while the poor, immigrant or indigenous 
segments of the population are at a serious legal disadvantage). 
3. In many countries we find a deficit in terms of political 
citizenship. Half of the population prefers economic development to 
democracy. These “non-democrats” comprise 26.5% of the 
population, whereas those in doubt (i.e., people who agree with the 
concept of democracy but think it is valid for the government to 
make anti-democratic decisions when conducting its business) 
account for 30.5%. That is to say, over half of all citizens are not 
committed to the true realization of a democratic system. 
4. Neo-liberal economic reforms have not met with people’s 
expectations. In the 1990s, a promise for development was devised 
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in the form of a neo-liberal economic model (the above-mentioned 
Washington Consensus), from which the majority of the population 
is nowadays excluded. That model recommended budgetary 
discipline, financial and commercial liberalization, privatizations, 
changes in public spending priorities… in short, a deregulation 
framework which at best places the State in a position as a referee 
between the different interest groups. Stronger links to the market 
have borne fruit at the macroeconomic level, but their effects have 
not reached many citizens: they did not lead to an appreciable 
reduction in poverty levels; they in fact increased inequalities and 
projected wide percentages of the population into the informal 
economy due to a lack of jobs. 
5. A weakening of the State has occurred. States have lost their 
ability to influence, control, regulate or benefit from transnational 
processes, or to withstand hegemonic tendencies in economic or 
political plans being prepared in the centers of financial power. In 
most of Latin America, the State evidences grave deficiencies vis-à-
vis the interests of local or international “factic” powers. 
6. New factic powers are emerging and we find a proliferation of 
interest groups (especially related to business) acting as powerful 
lobbies that distort forms of genuine democratic representation. 
And the mass media, which are part of business groups not 
subordinated to political powers, with highly diversified economic 
interests, act as “superpowers” limiting the sovereignty of public 
institutions. 
7. Corruption is an endemic evil undermining the rule of law in 
almost all the countries of the region. The nonchalant attitude 
taken towards corruption is like affects a very significant portion of 
society: 44.1% of the citizens surveyed accept paying the price of 
some degree of corruption in order to expedite bureaucratic 
procedures or cut through red tape. Dirty or black money has 
devastating effects on some of these countries’ institutions and 
political leaders. 
8. Moreover, the State has literally lost “pieces of its territory” 
which have been occupied by people conducting economic activities 
that are not only informal, but illegal. In many countries, drug 
trafficking controls significant amounts of resources as well as 
entire regions, where it wields a level of power similar to that of 
the State. The extension of drug trafficking implies a dual 
challenge: on the one hand, it attempts to control part of state 
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apparatuses and territories; on the other, it attracts the attention 
of the U.S., generating new forms of external pressure. 
CHALLENGES FOR CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY 
Latin American democracies are facing the challenges of 
consolidation and legitimation. That is why we should examine how 
well the social actors involved in political processes in each country 
have managed to realize their aspirations. We should also delve into 
the “sustainability of democracy,” i.e., its ability to last as a 
political system without a violent breakdown of its institutions, but 
also without becoming stagnated. We need only recall the case of 
Venezuela, where the deterioration of a party system that was 
formally democratic but that did not represent the majority of the 
population led to its virtual disappearance of traditional political 
parties, shortly before Hugo Chávez entered office. 
To achieve true consolidation of democracy, the State must be able 
to change, to perfect itself on the basis of citizens’ participation; 
thus, both its political power and institutions may acquire 
legitimacy. There is a kind of tension between the market economy 
and a democratic political system (Offe 1992, Maravall 1995, 
Przeworski 1995). In this sense, we encounter great contrasts in the 
opinions and historical experiences of different Latin American 
countries regarding the likelihood that a democratic regime may 
establish an efficient market economy and, at the same time, 
create a more equitable and just economic system. 
On the other hand, tensions are derived from the legal structure, 
based on the right to private property because large companies are 
uneasy with democratic theory and visions (Gianfranco Pasquino 
2000:17-18). Lastly, the experiences of many nations currently show 
that the relationship between democracy and the free market is not 
as linear and harmonious as some authors in the late twentieth 
century came to believe. 
The electoral rules we know today are a victory of the masses that 
burst into political life in the twentieth century for the purpose of 
ensuring the realization of their rights. Political democracy was a 
gradual conquest of masses against authoritarian regimes; however, 
today, in the twenty-first century, we are becoming aware of the 
limitations of political democracy due to the discrediting of political 
parties, the use of marketing as a method for winning voters’ 
sympathies or because politicians –who were elected by the people– 
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actually lack the ability to make many of the decisions affecting 
voters since such decisions are undertaken in international financial 
centers. 
Despite all democracy currently offers better possibilities for 
developing citizenship in the myriad dimensions with which it has 
been conceived than other known types of political systems. From 
this conviction comes an interest in knowing more about other 
countries’ experiences when consolidating democracy and quality of 
democracy, and also in comparing the opportunities that can arise 
for different countries in regard to forms of representation, which 
entails restructuring political institutions and political parties, but 
above all discovering incentives for setting off polemic collective 
action that calls for reformulating political power structures and 
new ways of participating (which some authors have termed 
“radical democracy” (Mouffe 1992 ). 
In the present context, one of globalization’s effects has been a loss 
of decision-making capabilities on the part of the national state. 
This may explain, albeit only partially, why the hopes generated by 
the third democratic wave in the 1980s has not given way to 
advances in civil and social rights in keeping with the expectations 
that had been created, and why the right to elect one’s rulers often 
did not translate into greater freedom, justice, and progress. 
Nevertheless, the dilemmas now faced by democracies in Latin 
America should not make us lose our perspective. A poor democracy 
is better than a poor dictatorship. In this sense, Dasgupta (1993) 
clarified that democracy and freedom are as precious –in and of 
themselves– for the poor as they are for the rich. Thus, the issue to 
be analyzed here is whether that freedom impinges upon other 
aspects of material well-being. 
A study conducted on democracy, development, and well-being in 
140 countries (Przeworski, Álvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000) 
revealed that the correlation between development and democracy 
is strong but not definitive. Other historical factors come into play, 
such as a country’s political and cultural heritage (ethnic and 
religious heterogeneity), its institutional framework (presidentialism 
vs. parliamentarianism), and the world political climate, whose 
influence upon political change has not been adequately 
documented. 
Once a country achieves a level of development of 2 500 to 3 000 
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U.S. dollars per capita –such as Portugal, Mexico, Algeria or Costa 
Rica–, democracy makes a difference, not so much because a 
democratic setting guarantees a higher degree of development but 
because of the type of development achieved. In democratic 
countries, income distribution is more equitable and wages are 
higher (Przeworski, Álvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000:164). 
Dictatorships grow on the basis of greater capital investment and 
lower wages: since they can repress the workers, they can pay labor 
poorly and use it in a rather inefficient manner. Even though there 
may not be major differences between a dictatorship and a 
democracy in their general level of development, democracy does 
make a difference in the specific characteristics assumed by the 
development process: for example, employment, social policies, 
productive investment, etc. (Przeworski, Álvarez, Cheibub, and 
Limongi 2000:168). 
 
THE LATIN AMERICAN LEFT AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 
It is also possible that, on this region’s political scene, the failure of 
the Washington Consensus has prompted a significant shift towards 
the left. Municipal, legislative or presidential elections held in 
Venezuela (Hugo Chávez), Brazil (Lula da Silva), Chile (Ricardo 
Lagos), the Dominican Republic (Lionel Fernández), Panama (Martín 
Torrijos), Uruguay (Tabaré Vázquez), and Bolivia (Evo Morales) have 
evidenced this overall trend towards the left. 
A little more than two years ago in the Argentine capital, Kirchner 
and Lula, presidents of Argentina and Brazil, respectively, signed 
what has been called the Buenos Aires Consensus. In essence, that 
document was intended to address citizens’ well-being and the 
redistribution of income and wealth as priority goals for their 
countries’ economic policies, without sacrificing basic 
macroeconomic stability. In a parallel fashion, this policy has been 
implemented in Chile by the Gobierno de la Concertación and by 
Ricardo Lagos. With its name, the Buenos Aires Consensus offered a 
kind of alternative to the Washington Consensus, and could be 
deemed a social democratic version of the latter, but 
unfortunately, all too soon it drifted into clandestinity. 
It is interesting to compare the effect of democratization in the 
experiences of Mexico and Portugal during the 1980s, when both 
nations had similar levels of income per capita. Whereas in Portugal 
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one could observe a strategy more concerned with the well-being of 
the entire population, in Mexico inequalities were heightened in 
that same period. 
On October 7 and 8, 2005, over 30 Ibero-American economists met 
in the city of Salamanca to analyze the Barcelona Development 
Agenda more closely and proposed the drafting of national agendas 
based on consensuses; the reduction of inequalities in the region 
and the promotion of opportunities for all; greater investment in 
human development; and a suitable framework for regulating 
international migration. In addition, they advocated more markets, 
a higher degree of competition, and better states; a greater 
opening up, innovation, and integration at the regional level; and 
greater flexibility in exchange rates. They also stressed the need for 
financial de-dollarization, promoting bank usage and creating 
capital markets in domestic currency. Lastly, they recommended 
redesigning the international financial architecture, placing 
emphasis on a modification of the role of the International Monetary 
Fund. 
 
GLOBALIZATION: AN OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT FOR A 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE? 
Globalization is a complicated, multifaceted phenomenon, but at 
the same time it has become a sort of “fetish word.” Here I am 
referring to concepts that are used to define scenarios, as excuses 
to justify actions, denounce unjust situations, to support particular 
policies or simply to express disconcertedness in the face of the 
intricacies of a given historical period. The term “globalization” 
began to be used in the 1960s as a prism reflecting the complexity 
and interdependence of the world capitalist system. 
Globalization as we have experienced it since around 1970 involves 
a process of instantaneous communications (impossible to control 
within the “national space” under the administration of the State), 
which has occurred thanks to satellite technology. 
Cultural processes that have been unleashed should be viewed from 
an anthropological perspective. These processes go far beyond neo-
liberalism, even though at this stage big capital and above all 
financial actors have been taking the greatest advantage of this 
situation, and also, at least in theory, they have been the most 
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well-prepared for comprehending it. The biggest sin of the left has 
been a failure to do some very serious thinking about these changes 
and their impact on economic development models and especially 
on political action. For that reason, not only socialist or planned 
economies have undergone a crisis, but also social - democratic 
economies which were so successful in the late twentieth century 
because they facilitated the development of mechanisms for 
negotiation and counterweights among the interests of opposing 
political actors such as businessmen and unions, in a national 
context. 
Thus, globalization has modified the fundamental concepts upon 
which the construction of traditional nation-states was grounded: 
power, sovereignty, territory, and self-determination are all 
concepts that will have to be redefined in the era of global 
capitalism. We should also consider the transformation of citizens’ 
lives, changes in the family, and modifications of gender roles and, 
in general, in lifestyles. Therefore, globalization reflects the 
“expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up, and deepening 
impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social 
interaction” (Held and McGrew 2003:13). New political actors 
emerge from this cultural changes and old actors in new 
environment that offers different opportunities.  
Since the dimensions of countries’ political arena came to be 
modified, the concept of what is “national” took on new meanings, 
while political actors lost certain resources and gained others. I 
maintain the hypothesis that traditional actors on the left –such as 
unions, parties, and the State itself– lost resources and strength, 
while others –such as the media or financial capital– became very 
powerful. That is why the left needs a different strategy to 
successfully insert itself in this new national space –so intensely 
linked to international affairs– the political agendas and demands of 
society’s marginalized sectors. 
Moreover, within nation-states, globalization has spurred a process 
of decentralization, regionalization, and a reassessment of 
subnational political units. As early as 1996, a document published 
by the OECD with the title Globalisation: What Challenges and 
Opportunities for Governments? outlined the dual direction to be 
taken by this change for governments and public administrations. 
On the one hand, it posed the need for adjusting governments’ 
structures, making it feasible for them to govern in an increasingly 
interdependent world and, on the other, it emphasized the 
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necessity for a thorough analysis of the impacts of globalization on 
national and international policies, as well as on the restructuring 
of relations among the different actors participating in the process 
of designing public policies, stressing –and I think this is good news– 
that the final goal is none other than to protect and strengthen 
democracy. Differentiated political regions call far a new 
geographical analytical perspective, not to override regional 
differences with the national average.    
In the consolidation process, issues concerned with the results that 
democratic governments offer their citizens become even more 
relevant; examples of these are security, the administration of 
justice and social and economic policies, the goal seems to be to 
create employment and ensure well-being. The poor performance 
and outcomes of “democratic” Latin American governments 
represent an obstacle for the consolidation of democracy because 
the population is disappointed by the meager results of the turnover 
of political power. 
 
QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The discussion above lays the foundation for further enquiry.  It 
would be most useful to combine a very traditional political party 
system analysis with the study of new factors that "weaken 
democracies" today in order to enquire into how tensions are 
resolved between the demands posed by dispossessed segments of 
the population in democratic societies and the options for 
determining social policies in the contemporary world, so 
dominated by globalization.  Questions that arise are: How can the 
exigencies of neo-liberal structural reforms be reconciled with the 
public demands voiced freely by political actors in democratic 
systems? How has the party system changed in recent years? 
Besides the study of party systems, it is pertinent to pay special 
attention to: 
-The new and old factic powers in their interaction with political 
institutions and political parties, in particular, 
• The mass media and its highly diversified economic interests.  
• The corruption that is penetrating public institutions.  
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• The dirty  money with its devastating effects on institutions and 
political leaders.  
• The drug trafficking and national security. 
The countries amenable to such study are those where a recent 
election produced a party turn over or at least an important shift in 
political orientation, to be compared with those countries with a 
long period of stability and consolidated political system, in risk of 
becoming "to consolidated".   
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